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Abstract
Environmental policy often has to be devised under informational con-
straints, like uncertainty and asymmetric information. We consider an envi-
ronmental policy that aims at reducing the welfare losses caused by asym-
metric information while being sufficiently simple for implementation. In
this policy, firms can choose between being regulated with an emission tax
or a permit market. This serves as a screening device; the firms reveal pri-
vate information by choosing an instrument. We show that such a menu
of policy options improves upon conventional environmental policy. Fur-
thermore, the optimal policy is simple and thus easily implementable. The
approach is also theoretically interesting, because the simultaneous use of
price- and quantity-based instruments induces an asymmetry into the prices-
versus-quantities decision compared to Weitzman’s criterion. Especially,
there can be an optimal pooling equilibrium where all firms choose the tax,
but it is never optimal that all firms participate in permit trading.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, environmental policy is envisioned as a tool used by a governmen-
tal agency to regulate an industry’s emissions. The agency levies a tax, sets a
standard, or implements a permit market and the firms decide on production and
abatement under the incentives provided by this policy.
Whereas this “top-down” type of policy performs well under perfect informa-
tion, it is well-known that it can implement only a second-best allocation under
informational constraints like asymmetric information or uncertainty [17]. Such
constraints are ubiquitous in practice. Usually, firms have better knowledge con-
cerning their technology than a regulation authority, so that there is asymmetric
information, and the limited predictability of future factor prices induces uncer-
tainty.
Numerous policy concepts have been devised to counter the effects of such
incomplete information. Some of these concepts rely on ex-post adjustments of
the policy, like automatic tax adjustments [3, 7], or adjustments to the number of
permits as in [2, 7, 9]. Other concepts are based on a sophisticated instrument de-
sign that renders ex-post adjustments unnecessary, like a system of rental permits
[1], the use of options in addition to permits [16], or the use of hybrid instruments
[11].
These instruments are apt at reducing the social costs of uncertainty. Most
of them can theoretically implement an ex-post efficient solution. However, this
requires rather complex designs, like a large number of different options with
differing strike prices, or it requires high levels of administrative flexibility, like
instant tax adjustments or instant open market operations on a permit market. Thus
in practice, these instruments will limit but not eliminate the detrimental effects
of uncertainty.
Whenever the effects of uncertainty are not perfectly countered, the other type
of informational constraints, that is, asymmetric information, will also reduce so-
cial welfare. Under uncertainty, the optimal choice of a regulation instrument de-
pends on the technology of the regulated firms [17]. If this technology is private
information, then the regulator might involuntarily use a suboptimal instrument
and thereby reduce expected social welfare below the achievable level.
But in contrast to uncertainty, the welfare losses due to asymmetric informa-
tion are not inevitable, even if only policy instruments with a limited complexity
can be used. Whereas countering uncertainty requires to provide for all possi-
ble future states of nature, overcoming asymmetric information only demands to
elicit already available information from the regulated firms. A potentially viable
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strategy for this is to decentralize a part of the regulatory decisions, that is, to let
the regulated firms decide the type of regulation. In this way, decisions are made
where the necessary information is available.
In other areas of economics, such concepts are common. For example, in-
surance companies are in a position comparable to an environmental regulator
with regard to being subject to uncertainty and asymmetric information. To re-
duce the detrimental effects of asymmetric information, they frequently offer a
range of insurance contracts, so that the insurance holder can decide which type
of insurance policy is best for her. In this way, the insurance company elicits pri-
vate information by partially delegating decisions to the party that has access to
the necessary information. The situation is indeed similar to many environmental
policy settings: Both the insurance holder and the insurance company lack infor-
mation concerning future conditions that affect their profit, the insurance holder
has private information that is needed to design an optimal insurance contract,
and an optimal insurance policy requires to differentiate between different types
of insurance holders.
But despite this similarity, comparable concepts are missing in environmental
policy. There are contract designs that are used to solve problems with specific
forms of asymmetric information, like non-point source pollution.1 But asym-
metric information with regard to technological characteristics is not addressed
in this way, although this type of informational constraint is nearly ubiquitous in
applications.
In this paper, we advance a policy concept where an important part of the pol-
icy decisions, that is the choice between a price- and a quantity-based regulation,
is left to the regulated firms. The regulator announces a menu of policy options, in
our case, an emission tax and permit trading, and each firm chooses its regulation
from this menu. Thereby, both the firms and the regulator are subject to uncer-
tainty at the time where the policy is chosen and the firms have private information
concerning their technology.
This design is inspired by the current climate policy used in Switzerland,
which consists of a carbon tax and an emissions trading scheme and allows the
regulated firms to choose between these instruments. The firms pay the carbon
tax but can get a refund if they commit to a prescribed emission reduction. If they
make this reduction commitment, they receive tradable emission permits for the
remaining emissions.
Using the model of [17], we show that such a policy menu can be designed so
1See , e.g., [6] or [13].
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that each firm voluntarily chooses the policy that is best for this firm from a social
perspective. To design such a menu, only three ingredients are necessary: The
regulator has to set an emission tax, has to issue emission permits, and has either
to give a limited tax exemption or to auction some of the permits. Compared to
the above mentioned policy designs, this concept is thus rather simple.
We provide a detailed characterization of the optimal design of this instrument
and show that the optimal policy menu improves upon a single policy in terms of
expected welfare. In addition, we analyze the firms’ policy choices and show that,
surprisingly, the firm that is indifferent between the two instruments will usually
not have a technology that meets the Weitzman criterion for choosing between a
price- and a quantity-based regulation. Rather, the optimal policy menu favors
the emission tax; in many cases, the instruments should be designed so that a
majority of firms will prefer the tax to emission trading. Furthermore, there can
be cases where all firms should be induced to choose the tax, whereas there are
virtually no cases in which all firms should be encouraged to participate in permit
trading. Finally, we use a numerical example to highlight under which conditions
our concept, which counters asymmetric information, is inferior or superior to the
hybrid regulation of [11], which reduces the costs of uncertainty.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the
relevant literature. In Section 3, we advance our model. In Section 4, we charac-
terize the optimal policy. Section 5 provides a numerical example and Section 6
concludes.
2 Review of the Literature
Our study is related to the prices-versus-quantities literature and to the literature
on screening on labor and insurance markets.
Initiated by [17], the prices-versus-quantities literature analyzes the choice
between a price- and quantity-based environmental policy in a setting, where the
marginal abatement costs of the regulated firms are uncertain at the time when the
regulation is designed. As shown in [17] and [18], in the case of a single firm,
a price-based instrument, like a tax, is preferable, if the marginal abatement cost
function has a smaller slope than the marginal damage function, and a quantity-
based instrument, like a permit market or a standard, is preferable in the opposite
case. If there are several firms with distinct abatement cost functions, a weighted
average of the slope of the firms’ abatement costs has to be used for the compar-
ison. So these studies show that under informational constraints, the preferability
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of regulation concepts depends on the firms’ technologies.
Several studies have followed this line of analysis and advanced instruments
that can improve upon a simple price or quantity regulation. Closest to our study
is [11], who show that a hybrid regulation that consists of a permit market with a
lower and an upper price limit (established by a subsidy and an emission tax, re-
spectively), can achieve a higher expected welfare than each of these instruments
alone. The price limits reduce the influence of uncertainty; whenever the permit
price equals one of these limits, the aggregate emissions can deviate from the total
number of permits and this flexibility increases social welfare.
Other instruments that can achieve similar effects are option trading, as ana-
lyzed in [16], where in addition to permits options for buying additional permits at
ex-ante set prices are issued. Also, permits could be rented at prices that increase
with the total number of permits [1], or the number of permits could be adjusted
over time, as in [2, 9].
Our study deviates from these concepts in that we focus not on reducing the
negative impact of uncertainty but rather on alleviating the detrimental effect of
asymmetric information. To achieve this, we will use a setup where the policy
is chosen and fixed before the uncertainty is resolved. In contrast, the above ap-
proaches rely all on providing some flexibility for ex-post adjustments. We will
discuss the importance of this difference in the following section.
In this respect, our study comes close to the screening literature, where a set of
contract options is considered as a screening device for a competitive insurance or
labor market in cases in which information is asymmetrically distributed among
agents, see [10, 12, 14]. The incomplete information problem arises, for example,
with regard to the risk that individuals face, which is private information. The self-
selection of a contract provides the insurance company with information about the
individuals’ risk exposure.
The screening literature differs from our approach in several aspects. In the
screening literature, the contracts are designed to maximize the expected profit of
the insurance company either under competition or in a monopoly. In contrast, we
are concerned with minimizing the expected social costs of the regulation, which
includes the expected profits of the regulated firms. Moreover, in the screening
literature there is an "exit-option", that is, individuals are not obliged to buy an
insurance. In our setup, firms have to choose a policy option.
The standard setting in the screening literature results in a separating equilib-
rium when two groups of risk types are to be considered and markets are competi-
tive. The individuals select among partial and full insurance in order to maximize
their utility. The case is somewhat different when individuals are represented by
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a continuum of risk types and the market is served by a monopolist [15]. The
monopolist then does best by offering a continuum of contracts. Separation, no-
insurance and pooling within a class of risk probability types may all be possible
parts of the solution.
In our setting, both pooling and separating equilibria are also possible. How-
ever, it is not optimal to offer more than two policy options to the firms.
3 The Model
To analyze the benefits of letting firms choose their regulation, we consider an
extension of the prices-versus-quantities model of [17]. A fixed number of firms
emit a homogenous pollutant, which causes environmental damage. The firms
can reduce their emissions by abatement. There are different types of firms that
use different technologies and thus have different abatement cost functions. A
regulator sets an environmental policy to reduce the total costs arising from envi-
ronmental damage and the firms’ abatement activities.
The regulation is subject to informational constraints. The regulator does not
know which firm uses which technology, that is, there is asymmetric informa-
tion with regard to a firm’s type. Furthermore, the abatement costs are subject to
random influences, like changing factor prices, demand-side shocks, or the break-
down of production equipment. Thus there is uncertainty both from the regulator’s
and from a firm’s perspective.
Whereas the uncertainty is often an unavoidable problem, which could only be
addressed by using sophisticated policy instruments that demand a high level of
administrative flexibility [4], the detrimental effects of the asymmetric informa-
tion can be reduced by using standard policy measures, albeit in an unconventional
way. The idea is to provide individual firms with some choice concerning their
regulation, so that a part of the regulation is decided by actors that have all the
available information.
To this end we consider the following policy setup. The regulator offers the
firms a choice between paying an emission tax and participating in an emission
trading scheme. The firms have to commit to one policy option for several periods.
The timing is shown in Figure 1. First, the regulator announces a menu of policy
options, being subject to asymmetric information and uncertainty. Second, each
firm commits to one of the policy options. Finally in each period, the actual
abatement costs are observed and the firms make their abatement decisions under
the chosen policy option.
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Step 1 Step 2
policy an-
nouncement
instrument
choice
θt=1 θt=2 θt=3 ...
random variables are realized; firms make
their abatement decisions
Step 3
Figure 1: The timing of decisions in our model.
This setup models a setting, where abatement costs are subject to persistent
uncertainty, which is often the case due to volatile factor prices. Firms have to
choose their regulation knowing that they will commit for some time to this regu-
lation and therefore they will choose according to their expected costs.
This differs from the setup of [11], where firms can choose in each period after
observing their abatement costs whether to buy permits or pay a tax. This differ-
ence is crucial for gaining information about the firms’ types: If firms can choose
the regulation ex-post, their choices will be influenced both by their technology
and by the realization of the random events. Thus their choice does not reveal
private information about their technology. Indeed, in the setup of [11], all firms
will choose the same policy option regardless of their technology. In contrast, if
firms have to decide ex-ante about their preferred regulation, their choice depends
only on their technology and thus provides useful information. We will work out
the differences and their welfare implications more clearly in Section 4.
The choice of the two policy instruments, an emission tax and a permit market,
is inspired by [17] and [18], who show that depending on the firms’ abatement
cost functions, either a price- or a quantity-based instruments should be used for
regulation. Furthermore, this setup closely resembles the current climate policy in
Switzerland, where firms are reimbursed for their payments of a carbon-based tax
if they participate in a CO2-based emission trading scheme.
To analyze this policy, we use the following variant of Weitzman’s model [17].
There is continuum of firms with mass one that have the following abatement cost
function
C(a, β, θ) := (α+ θ)a+
a2
2β
, (1)
where a denotes abatement, where θ depicts a random influence and where α ≥ 0
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and β > 0 describe a firm’s technology.2 We assume that the random influences
are firm-specific but are positively correlated among firms with a correlation coef-
ficient % ∈]0, 1]. The expected value of θ shall be zero and we denote its variance
by σ2 > 0. The values of the θ shall be intertemporally independent.
The firms differ with regard to their value of β. Given the results of [17]
and [18], this is a natural choice. Of course in most real-world settings, firms’
abatement costs will differ with regard to more parameters. But for sufficiently
small random influences, the quadratic approximation used in (1) is adequate and
as [17] has shown, only the second-order term is relevant for deciding between
policy instruments.3 For analytical convenience, we assume that the parameter β
is uniformly distributed over [βˆ −∆, βˆ +∆] with βˆ > ∆ and ∆ > 0.
The emissions of a firm exerting abatement effort a are given by e = e¯−a. The
environmental damage caused by pollution D(E) is described by the following
quadratic function
D(E) = γE +
E2
2δ
, (2)
where E denotes total pollution and where γ ≥ 0, δ > 0 are constant parameters.
The policy consists of three measures. First, the regulator grants (freely) zq
permits to each firm that participates in the emission trading scheme. Second, the
regulator sets an emission tax pp. Third, the regulator auctions additional permits
or grants firms that have chosen the emission tax a partial tax exemption zp.
Whereas the first two elements of the policy scheme are standard, the third one
is less commonly discussed but crucial to the welfare effects of the policy. Usu-
ally, an emission tax has to be paid for all emitted units, whereas permits are often
granted freely. Thus firms opting for emission trading receive a “subsidy” com-
pared to the firms that pay the tax. This would result in an incentive to participate
in emissions trading that is unrelated to a firm’s technology. Auctioning a fraction
of the permits or granting a partial tax exemption reduces and potentially reverses
this incentive and thus allows to set a menu of policy options that guarantees that
a firm chooses the type of regulation that is best from a social perspective.
2For notational simplicity, we use the reciprocal value of the second derivative of C(a, β, θ) as
a technology parameter. Thus compared to the notation used in [17], we have C ′′ = 1/β.
3Indeed, we could allow for different values of α among firms, but this would only result in a
more complex notation without changing our results.
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4 The Optimal Policy
We derive the optimal policy by backward induction and thus begin with the firms’
abatement decisions. Given that the random influences are intertemporally inde-
pendent, it suffices to analyze a single period of the third stage of our model.
Consider a firm of type β that opts to pay the emission tax. This firm will
minimize its total cost, given the tax rate pp and the tax exemption zp:
min
a≥0
(α+ θ)a+
a2
2β
+ pp (e¯− a− zp) . (3)
This results in emissions4
ep(β, θ) = e¯− β (pp − α− θ) , (4)
and expected costs
E (Cp(β)) = pp (e¯+ αβ − zp)− β
2
(
p2p + α
2 + σ2
)
. (5)
As is apparent from (5), the firms’ expected costs increase with the tax rate and
decrease with the tax exemption. Also, the firm benefits from the cost uncertainty.
With constant abatement, the firms’ expected costs would be independent of σ,
since the cost function is linear in the random variable. By optimally adjusting its
abatement, the firm can improve upon this case and thereby decrease its expected
costs. This decrease is proportional to the variance σ2 of the random influence.
A firm that chooses to participate in the emissions trading scheme will mini-
mize the costs
min
a≥0
(α+ θ)a+
a2
2β
+ pq (e¯− a− zq) , (6)
where zq denotes the number of costlessly granted permits and where pq is the en-
dogenously determined market clearing price for permits. The optimal emissions
of such a firm are given by
eq(β, θ) = e¯− β (pq − α− θ) . (7)
According to [17], we know that the permit market should contain firms with
a high β (and thus a low C ′′ in the notation of [17]) rather than those with a low
β. Such an allocation of firms to the policy instruments is depicted in Figure 2.
4Here, we have assumed that either the tax exemption is smaller than the emissions of the
cleanest firm or that the tax exemption is granted in the form of a fixed subsidy that is not limited
by actual emissions.
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βf(β)
β̂ −∆ β̂ β̂ +∆βcrit
tax permit trading
Figure 2: The firms’ choice of policy instruments in dependency on their tech-
nology.
Assuming that the policy will be set in a way that all firms with β ≥ βcrit
(with βcrit ≤ βˆ +∆) will elect to participate in the emissions trading scheme, the
market clearing condition can be written as∫ βˆ+∆
βcrit
eq(β, θ)− zq − zaucq
2∆
dβ = 0, (8)
where zaucq denotes the number of permits per firm in the emission trading scheme
that are auctioned.
The market clearing price for emission permits is thus
pq = α+ 2
e¯− zq − zaucq
βcrit + βˆ +∆
+ 2
θpq
βcrit + βˆ +∆
, (9)
where θpq denotes the changes of the permit price resulting from the individual
cost changes θ. Calculating θpq shows that we have E
(
θpq
)
= 0, E
(
θ2pq
)
=
(βcrit + βˆ +∆)
2%σ2/4 and E (θpqθ) = (βcrit + βˆ +∆)%σ2/2. The expected costs
for a firm of type β are therefore given by
E (Cq(β)) =α(e¯− zq)− β
2
(1− %)σ2 (10)
+
2(e¯− zq − zaucq )
(
βzaucq + (e¯− zq)(βcrit + βˆ +∆− β)
)
(βcrit + βˆ +∆)2
.
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The firm’s expected costs decrease both with the number of costlessly granted and
the number of auctioned permits (albeit stronger with the former than the latter)
and, again, the firm benefits from the cost uncertainty. However, in the case of
emissions trading, the gain due to uncertainty is smaller. Due to % > 0, there is a
correlation between the firms’ random influences and thus between an individual
firm’s abatement costs and the permit price, which reduces the firm’s abatement
adjustments.
Given the expected costs under both policy options, we can now analyze a
firm’s choice from the menu of regulations. Comparing the expected costs un-
der the tax regime (5) and under the permit trading scheme (10) shows that the
difference between these costs depends linearly on β. Thus there can at most be
a single type of firm (i.e., a single value of β) which is indifferent between the
policy options; all other firms have strict preferences. We can identify this firm
by equating the expected costs of the policy options and setting β = βcrit. In this
way we get the following characterization of the indifferent firm.
pp (e¯+ αβcrit − zp)− βcrit
2
(
p2p + α
2
)
(11)
−
α(e¯− zq) + 2(e¯− zq − zaucq )
(
βcritz
auc
q + (e¯− zq)(βˆ +∆)
)
(βcrit + βˆ +∆)2

= βcrit%
σ2
2
.
As this expression shows, a firm is indifferent between the instruments, if the gains
from uncertainty under the tax regime are greater than the gains from uncertainty
in the permit regime by an amount that compensates the difference in the total
deterministic costs between the instruments. Since the gains from uncertainty are
always greater in the tax than in the permit case, the total deterministic costs (i.e.,
the costs if future prices would be known with certainty) of paying the tax have to
be greater for the indifferent firm than the total deterministic costs of participating
in the permit trading scheme. So if, for example, the expected permit price should
equal the tax rate and all permits are granted freely, then the tax exemption has to
be smaller than the number of permits issued per firm.
To calculate the optimal policy, we also need information concerning the emis-
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sions, the resulting damage, and the tax revenue. The emissions are given by
E =
(zq + z
auc
q )(βˆ +∆− βcrit)
2∆
+
(βcrit +∆− βˆ)
(
2e¯+ 2θE − (pp − α)(βcrit + βˆ −∆)
)
4∆
,
(12)
where θE denotes the random variation of total emissions that is due to the random
cost changes. Calculating θE shows that E (θE) = 0 and E (θ2E) = (βcrit + βˆ −
∆)2%σ2/4.
The expected environmental damage follows from substituting the total emis-
sions (12) in the damage function (2) and calculating the expected value. Note
that for βcrit > βˆ − ∆, that is, whenever there are firms that choose the tax, the
emissions include a random component. By the strict convexity of the damage
function (2), this random component increases the expected damage. Thus as in
[17], using a price-based regulation induces volatility in the aggregate emissions,
which incurs social costs.
The expected tax revenue E (T ) can be calculated as
E (T ) = pp
(
βcrit +∆− βˆ
)(2e¯− 2zp − (pp − α)(βcrit + βˆ −∆)
4∆
)
. (13)
As usual, the expected tax revenue in dependency on the tax rate pp has the form
of a Laffer curve, since increasing tax rates induce more abatement activity and
thus eventually reduce the tax revenue.
Given the above information, the environmental policy is chosen to minimize
social costs, given the firms’ choice of regulation instrument, that is, the regulator
solves
min
pp,zp,zq ,zaucq ≥0
∫ βcrit
βˆ−∆
E (Cp(β))
2∆
dβ +
∫ βˆ+∆
βcrit
E (Cq(β))− pqzaucq
2∆
dβ + E (D(E))− E (T ) ,
(14)
s.t. (11).
The following proposition characterizes the solution of this optimization problem.
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Proposition 1. The optimal menu of policies is given by
pp =
e¯+ αβˆ + γδ
βˆ + δ
, (15)
zq + z
auc
q =
δ(α− γ)
(
β∗crit +∆+ βˆ
)
+ e¯
(
2δ − β∗crit −∆+ βˆ
)
2(βˆ + δ)
, (16)
zp = zq − %σ2 β
∗
crit(βˆ + δ)
2
(
e¯+ αβˆ + γδ
) . (17)
Given this policy, the indifferent firm is characterized by
β∗crit =

√(
βˆ −∆
)2
+ 2∆δ, for δ ≤ 2βˆ,
βˆ +∆, otherwise.
(18)
All firms with β < β∗crit will opt for the emission tax, whereas all firms with
β > β∗crit will participate in the emission trading scheme.
Proof. Calculating the derivatives of the expected social costs specified in (14)
with respect to pp, zq, zaucq leads to a linear equation system with rank two and the
solutions (15)–(16). The expected social costs are independent of zp and (11) is
an implicit surjective mapping of zp ∈ R to βcrit ∈ [βˆ −∆, βˆ +∆]. Thus we can
optimize (14) with respect to βcrit instead of zp. This optimization yields three
solutions, from which only (18) can possibly fall into the range [βˆ − ∆, βˆ + ∆],
which is the case whenever δ ≤ 2βˆ.
If δ ≤ 2βˆ, then the Hessian of the expected social costs with regard to pp, zq, βcrit
is locally positive definite at (15), (16), and (18), so that these values indeed in-
duce minimal expected social costs. If δ > 2βˆ, then we have a boundary optimum
at βcrit = βˆ +∆, because the expected social costs are strictly decreasing in βcrit
on [βˆ −∆, βˆ +∆] in this case.
Finally, (17) follows from solving Eq. (11) under (15) and (16). That all
firms with β < β∗crit choose the tax, whereas all firms with β > β
∗
crit will choose
emission trading follows directly from comparing the firms’ expected costs for
both instruments under (15)–(18).
Proposition 1 provides a full characterization of the optimal policy. It shows
that of the four policy variables pp, zp, zq, zaucq , three are needed to achieve the
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best feasible solution. This is intuitive; for each instrument, one policy variable is
needed to set average emissions, and an additional policy variable is necessary to
induce the socially desirable self-allocation of the firms to the policy instruments.
The optimal policy menu has several interesting characteristics, which we de-
rive in the following corollaries.
Corollary 1. The tax rate in the optimal policy menu is the same tax that would
be optimal if only an emission tax is used. Furthermore, the expected permit price
equals the tax rate in the optimal policy menu.
Proof. Solving the regulators optimization problem for βcrit = βˆ +∆ yields (15)
as a unique solution. Substituting (15)–(18) into (9) and calculating the expected
permit price yields the r.h.s. of (15).
So, the optimal policy menu is very simple. It consists of an emission tax
whose rate should be set as if the tax was the only implemented instrument. Then
a sufficient number of permits is issued to assure that the expected permit price
equals this tax rate.
This result is intuitive. Supplying permits so that the expected permit price
equals the tax rate assures that the expected marginal abatement costs are the
same for all firms, regardless of the instrument that they choose. This minimizes
the total expected abatement costs for a given level of expected emissions. Since
the expected marginal abatement costs are the same for all firms, the tax rate (and
thus the expected permit price) can be chosen to equalize the expected marginal
damage of emissions with the expected marginal abatement costs, which is a stan-
dard requirement for a second-best policy under cost uncertainty.
These two instruments suffice to assure an optimal allocation of emissions
and abatement efforts. What remains is to assure an optimal allocation of the
risk of cost changes and the possibly resulting emission volatility between firms
and the society. As discussed above, a firm benefits from being able to adjust its
abatement efforts to its actual costs. However, under a tax regime, where this is
best possible, these adjustments lead to variations of the total emissions, which
increase the expected damage. The relative strength of these effects depends on
the technology of the firm. An optimal policy menu thus has to assure that those
firms whose cost decrease due to better adjustment possibilities are greater than
the increase in the expected damage due to having more volatile emissions choose
the tax, whereas the other firms choose permit trading. The remaining policy
variables (zp, zaucq ) can be used to this end.
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Corollary 2. Define
ω :=
δ(α− γ)(β∗crit +∆+ βˆ) + e¯(2δ + βˆ −∆− β∗crit)
2(βˆ + δ)
− %σ2 β
∗
crit(βˆ + δ)
2(e¯+ αβˆ + γδ)
.
(19)
a) For every zp ∈ [0, ω] and for every zaucq ∈ [0, ω] a corresponding zaucq or zp
can be found, so that the optimal policy menu specified in Proposition 1 can
be achieved.
b) The tax exemption is always strictly smaller than the number of freely granted
permits per firm.
c) It is never optimal to auction all permits.
Proof. By (17), zq is increasing in zp. Furthermore, by (16), zaucq is decreasing
in zq. So the minimal feasible value of zp, which is zp = 0, sets an upper bound
for zaucq and the minimal feasible value of z
auc
q sets an upper boundary for zp.
Calculating these upper boundaries from (16) and (17) shows that both equal ω
as defined in (19). Given the linearity of (16) and (17) in zp, zq, and zaucq , the
solution of (15)–(18) yields feasible values for all choices of zp or zaucq within the
boundaries indicated in statement a).
Statement b) follows from (17), because the second term on the r.h.s. is strictly
positive. Statement c) follows from setting zp = 0, which, by the above argument,
leads to the minimal number of freely granted permits. According to (17), this
minimal number is strictly greater than zero.
So as indicated in the above discussion, the optimal policy leaves one degree
of freedom. Especially, it is possible to have no tax exemption, in which case an
appropriate number of permits have to be auctioned, or to grant all permits freely,
in which case an appropriate tax exemption is necessary. But it is never optimal
to auction all permits or to grant a tax exemption that is greater or equal than the
number of freely issued permits; both policy designs would lead to a too strong
incentive for choosing the tax.
Up to now, we have characterized the optimal choice of the policy variables.
What remains is to analyze the implicit allocation of firms to the price-based and
the quantity-based regulation. The results of [17] and [18] suggest that firms with
a low β (and thus a high C ′′ in the notation of [17]) should be regulated with a tax
and those with a high β should participate in permit trading. The threshold for the
instrument choice would be β = δ. Indeed, calculating the expected social costs
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in our model for the cases where only an emission tax or only a permit market
is used, shows that the former case dominates the latter with regard to expected
social welfare whenever β < δ, and the latter case dominates the former when-
ever β > δ. So it would seem prudent to assume that an optimal policy menu
is characterized by a similar symmetry between price- and quantity-based instru-
ments and that the firm that is indifferent between optimally designed instruments
should have a technology with β = δ.
However, the following proposition shows that this is not true. There is a
strong asymmetry between the price-based and the quantity-based part of an opti-
mal policy menu.
Proposition 2. For δ > 0, it is always optimal that some firms choose the emis-
sion tax. In contrast, in an optimal policy menu there is only participation in the
emissions trading scheme, if δ < 2βˆ.
The indifferent firm has a technology with β > δ, if δ < ∆+
√
(βˆ −∆)2 +∆2,
and it has a technology with β < δ, whenever δ > ∆+
√
(βˆ −∆)2 +∆2.
Proof. By (18), we have β∗crit = βˆ −∆ (which is the permits only case) only for
δ = 0, but we have β∗crit = βˆ + ∆ (the tax only case), whenever δ ≥ 2βˆ. The
further assertions follow from (18), which shows that β∗crit is strictly monotonous
increasing in δ with β∗crit = δ for δ = ∆+
√
(βˆ −∆)2 +∆2.
Thus the tax should always be chosen by some firms, if the marginal damage
function is not completely inelastic. In contrast, there is an easily met condition
under which the permit trading scheme should not be used at all. Whenever the
slope of the marginal damage function is less than half of that of the marginal
abatement cost function of the average firm, all firms should choose the emission
tax. In the language of the screening literature, there can be a pooling equilib-
rium where all firms choose the tax, but a pooling equilibrium where all firms
participate in permit trading is usually not optimal.
The reason for this asymmetry is the following. Consider the case, where the
instruments are designed so that all firms choose permit trading. If we redesign the
policy menu, so that the firms with the lowest value of β (i.e., β = βˆ−∆) choose
instead the emission tax, then the total expected abatement costs will be reduced.
By Proposition 1, the tax will equal the average permit price, so that no distortions
arise, and the firms that choose the tax will have larger gains due to being able to
adjust their abatement efforts more strongly to their actual abatement cost. Indeed,
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the marginal change in total expected abatement costs due to a marginal increase
of βcrit at some value β×crit is
∂E (Ctot)
∂βcrit
∣∣∣∣
βcrit=β
×
crit
= −β×crit
%σ2
4∆
. (20)
For β×crit = βˆ −∆, this marginal effect is strictly negative.
The total expected damage will also change. By Proposition 1, both instru-
ments induce the same expected emissions for a given firm type. But increasing
βcrit implies that emissions become more volatile, which, due to the strict convex-
ity of the damage function, leads to a higher expected damage. However, if the
change occurs at a low level of βcrit, only a small fraction of the emissions are
volatile, so that the random changes are small compared to the total emissions.
Indeed, the marginal effect of increasing βcrit on the expected damage is given by
∂E (D(E))
∂βcrit
∣∣∣∣
βcrit=β
×
crit
= β×crit
(
β×
2
crit − (βˆ −∆)2
) %σ2
8∆2δ
. (21)
So if all firms choose permit trading (β×crit = βˆ −∆), then the marginal increase
in expected damage due to inducing the firms with the lowest β to choose instead
the emission tax is zero, whenever δ > 0. In words: If only a tiny fraction of firms
are regulated with the emission tax, the volatility of emissions is negligible com-
pared to the total emissions and thus does not induce higher expected damage (the
exception is the case δ → 0, where any variation of emissions leads to extreme
damage increases).
Thus increasing βcrit slightly from its minimal value induces gains but no costs
and is therefore optimal.
In contrast, if we start with all firms choosing the emission tax (βcrit = βˆ +
∆) and reduce βcrit, then this will increase the total expected abatement costs,
because some firms have less adjustment possibilities. Also, it will reduce the
expected damage, because the volatility of emissions decreases. Since none of
these marginal effects is zero, we have to compare their magnitude. Eqs. (20)
and (21), evaluated for βcrit = βˆ + ∆, show that the abatement cost increasing
effect is smaller than the damage reducing effect only if δ < 2βˆ. Thus only under
this condition, it is always optimal to induce some firms to participate in permit
trading.
So the difference to the Weitzman setup is that the negative effect of having
some firms under a price-based regulation is attenuated if other firms are regulated
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δβ
β̂
β̂ −∆
β̂ +∆
β = δ
βcrit
Figure 3: The indifferent firm in an optimal policy menu compared to the Weitz-
man criterion in dependency on δ.
on the basis of quantities, because this negative effect arises from an aggregate,
that is, the volatility of total emissions. In contrast, the negative effect of regulat-
ing firms with a quantity-based regulation is not reduced by the presence of price-
regulated firms, because this effect is an individual effect, that is, the increase
in individual abatement costs. Consequently, the simultaneous use of price- and
quantity-based instruments renders the price-based part more favorable compared
to the quantity-based part.
The second part of Proposition 2 emphasizes this point. We have depicted this
in Figure 3. This figure shows that if we consider the same range of δ as we use
for β, then for the majority of points, the optimal policy menu will induce more
firms to choose the emission tax than the Weitzman criterion would suggest. That
is, if there is a separating equilibrium, than this equilibrium is usually asymmetric
in the sense that there are more firms that choose taxes than there are firms that
choose permit trading.
The figure also shows that even if δ lies outside the range of β, it can be
optimal to use a technology mix. This is always the case for δ < βˆ − ∆, so that
we should use taxes and permit trading although all firms have a technology with
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β > δ. It can also be the case for δ > βˆ+∆, if∆ < βˆ. In such cases, it is optimal
to use both instruments, although all firms have a technology with β < δ.
This shows that offering firms the opportunity to choose their regulation has
welfare benefits for a considerable range of scenarios. Our concept encompasses
the use of a single instrument policy as in [17]. But as Figure 3 shows, this is not
optimal in many cases. Thus granting firms choices among policy options is often
welfare increasing.
Given this point, an interesting question is whether the policy menu should be
enlarged. Would it be beneficial to separate the firms into more than two groups?
The answer to this question is negative; providing more than two policy options
cannot be optimal. The reason is that as [17] has shown, price- and quantity-based
policies differ only with regard to two effects: The increase in environmental
damage due to the volatile emissions in a price-based regulation, and the increase
in the firms’ expected costs due to the reduced adjustment options in a quantity-
based regulation. The relative importance of these effects depends monotonically
on the difference between the curvature of the cost and the curvature of the damage
function. But this implies that there can exist at most a single firm type at which
the preferability of regulating a given firm with a price-based or a quantity-based
policy switches.5
Also, it is not reasonable to include other instruments, like standards, in the
policy menu, because these induce higher expected abatement costs than tradable
permits and have no benefits in terms of reducing the expected damage compared
to a permit market.
Finally, we compare our approach to the hybrid regulation scheme of [11]. Our
approach requires the firms to commit ex-ante to a regulation, whereas the hybrid
regulation allows them to choose their regulation ex-post, that is, after observing
their actual costs. Given that the welfare effects of the latter type of regulation de-
pend strongly on the distribution of the random cost shocks θ, concerning which
we have made no assumptions, it is not possible to formally derive general re-
sults with regard to the preferability of either regulation concept. Therefore we
will only provide a general discussion here and then support it with a numerical
5It is easily possible to see this formally by assuming that there would be a regulation that could
separate the firms into two isolated permit markets and two different tax regimes with switching
points βcrit1 , βcrit2 , βcrit3 ∈ [βˆ − ∆, βˆ + ∆]. Calculating the expected social costs as in (14),
but with four integrals, and minimizing these with regard to βcrit1 , βcrit2 , βcrit3 shows that the
only solution with βcrit1 , βcrit2 , βcrit3 ∈ [βˆ − ∆, βˆ + ∆] is a solution in which the firms are
separated into two groups with the policy outlined in Proposition 1. This holds regardless of
which instrument is applied to which subregion of [βˆ −∆, βˆ +∆].
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example in the following section.
The main difference between the hybrid regulation and our concept is that the
hybrid regulation allows to differentiate the regulation among different values of
the random shocks. If the actual abatement costs are extremely high or low, a
price-based regulation in the form of fixed taxes and subsidies is used, whereas
for actual abatement costs close to their expected value, a permit market is used.
This reduces the social costs of the uncertainty. However, all firms will always
choose the same instrument; if the observed permit price falls between the subsidy
and the tax, all firms participate in permit trading; otherwise they pay the tax or
sell permits to the lower guarantee price. Thus the hybrid regulation does not
differentiate among different types of firms.
Our approach has an opposite focus. The firms have to commit to a regulation
before knowing their actual abatement costs. Thus the regulation cannot attenuate
the social costs of the uncertainty. But the firms choose according to their tech-
nology, so that we achieve a differentiation according to firm types. As [17] has
shown, whether a price- or a quantity-based regulation should be used, depends
on the technology of firms. Thus differentiating the regulation with regard to firm
types yields welfare benefits. Our concept realizes these benefits.
Given this discussion, it seems natural to expect that the hybrid regulation of
[11] will be preferable if there is a high level of uncertainty (i.e., a large value of
σ2) but not too much technological heterogeneity (i.e., a small value of∆). In con-
trast, our approach should be preferable under conditions of considerable techno-
logical heterogeneity but not too large cost uncertainty. Given that it is impossible
to gain an explicit description of the welfare effects of the hybrid regulation, even
for simplistic distributional assumptions, we cannot prove this conjecture. How-
ever, it is intuitive and the numerical example in the following section supports
it.
5 A Detailed Example
In this section we provide a numerical example to highlight the important aspects
of our approach and to compare it to a single instrument policy as well as to
the hybrid regulation of [11]. For this, we have chosen numerical values for the
model parameters (see Table 1) that depict a case with substantial uncertainty and
some firm heterogeneity. We have chosen % = 1 to facilitate the comparison of
our approach with [11], where a single random variable influences the aggregate
abatement costs.
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e¯ = 1, α = 2, γ = 0,β̂ = 0.8, ∆ = 0.1, ρ = 1, σ = 1
δ = 0.7 δ = 0.8 δ = 0.9 δ = 0.8 δ = 0.8
zaucq = 0.05 z
auc
q = 0.05 z
auc
q = 0.05 z
auc
q = 0 z
auc
q = ω
Policy menu
pp 1.733 1.625 1.529 1.625 1.625
zq + zaucq 1.226 1.320 1.404 1.320 1.320
zp 0.947 1.022 1.087 1.072 0
β∗crit 0.794 0.806 0.819 0.806 0.806
zq 1.176 1.270 1.354 1.320 0.248
E (pq) 1.733 1.625 1.529 1.625 1.625
E (E) 1.213 1.300 1.376 1.300 1.300
Only tax
pp 1.733 1.625 1.529
Only permit trading
zq 1.213 1.300 1.376
E (pq) 1.733 1.625 1.529
Reduction in exp. soc. costs
compared to tax 20.359 % 19.512 % 19.796 %
Reduction in exp. soc. costs
compared to permits 13.393 % 19.512 % 28.977 %
Table 1: Design of the optimal policy menu and comparison with the single policy
case in a numerical example.
The first four lines of Table 1 describe the optimal menu of policies as char-
acterized in Proposition 1 for different values of δ and for different numbers of
auctioned permits. They show that the tax always equals the expected permit
price and that both are independent of zaucq but decreasing in δ. The tax exemption
is a decreasing function of zaucq . Furthermore, β
∗
crit increases with δ. This depen-
dency is depicted in Figure 4, which also shows that, in this example, the expected
social costs are very sensitive with regard to β∗crit. So this example highlights the
points of Proposition 1 and Corollary 2.
The lower part of Table 1 compares the policy menu with a policy based only
on a tax or only on permit trading. It shows that the expected emissions and the tax
rate of our approach equal the optimal choices in the single policy case. However,
by letting firms choose their regulation, our approach reduces the expected social
costs of the regulation considerably (about 20% in this example).
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∆ = 0.7
∆ = 0.9
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Βcrit
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
expected social cost
Figure 4: Expected social costs as a function of βcrit for different values of δ
(δ = 0.70, δ = 0.75, δ = 0.80, δ = 0.85, δ = 0.90).
Finally, we compare our concept to the hybrid regulation advanced in [11].
For this, we assume that the uncertain cost shocks are uniformly distributed. To
facilitate the comparison, we only use a tax and permit trading as instruments in
the hybrid regulation, that is, in contrast to [11], there is no subsidy that establishes
a lower boundary to the permit price. Figure 5 depicts the preferability of either
approach for different values of σ, which corresponds to uncertainty, and∆, which
corresponds to asymmetric information. As this figure shows, neither approach is
always recommendable. The hybrid regulation performs better whenever there
is much uncertainty and not too much asymmetric information. Our approach is
recommendable in cases where asymmetric information is more important than
uncertainty. This is in line with the conjecture made in the preceding section.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered a form of environmental policy that allows firms
to choose among different regulation options. The intention of this device is to
elicit private information about a firm’s abatement costs in similarity to contract-
based screening devices used on labor or insurance markets. We have shown
that under uncertainty and asymmetric information, such a policy menu allows to
achieve lower expected social costs than a single instrument. Thereby, the optimal
policy menu is relatively simple to devise and thus provides an applicable solution
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Figure 5: Comparison of our approach and the hybrid regulation for different
levels of uncertainty (σ) and asymmetric information (∆). In region A the policy
menu is preferable, in region B, the hybrid regulation is more recommendable.
to the problems posed by informational constraints in environmental policy. In
addition, the optimal policy menu has some interesting theoretical properties. It
is asymmetric with regard to choice between the price and quantity options in that
a pooling equilibrium where all firms choose the tax can be optimal, whereas a
pooling equilibrium with all firms choosing permit trading is never optimal. Also,
rather surprisingly, the prices-versus-quantities criteria of [17] and [18] do not
characterize to the firm that is indifferent between the policy options.
Our analysis extends the existing literature by focusing on alleviating the con-
sequences of asymmetric information instead of those of uncertainty. Closest to
our approach is the hybrid regulation scheme advanced in [11]. This scheme
reduces the impact of uncertainty by using a price-based or a quantity-based regu-
lation in dependency on the realization of random variables, like future prices. We
use a price or a quantity regulation in dependency on the technological character-
istics of a firm. Since firms differ with regard to these characteristics, price and
quantity instruments will often be used simultaneously in our concept, whereas
they are only used successively in [11].
As we have discussed and shown in a numerical example, both approaches
can be advantageous with the hybrid regulation scheme being preferable in cases
of strong cost uncertainty and not too strong firm heterogeneity and our approach
being advisable in the opposite setup. Thus both concepts are complements that
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should be applied in different circumstances. Furthermore, it might be interesting
to combine these approaches, that is, to let firms choose between a tax and a permit
market with price limits. But this would results in a regulation that is most likely
too complex for being implemented.
Our analysis is also connected to the screening literature, especially to the
literature on insurance contracts. It shows that the main idea of eliciting private
information by providing several options can be successfully transferred to the de-
sign of environmental policy. However, several adjustments are necessary. Most
importantly, environmental policy is designed to balance the policy’s effects on
the environment with its effect on the regulated firms. Thus, in contrast to the
screening literature, the costs of the screened individuals are part of the policy
objective and not only a constraint. Also, there is neither competition among con-
tract offers nor an exit-option in the policy setting, so that important constraints
of the screening literature are missing.
Our investigation has been inspired by the climate policy recently implemented
in Switzerland. This policy consists of an emission tax combined with a permit
market and the regulated firms are allowed to choose between these options. There
are two main differences between our model and this implemented policy. First,
the firms that have chosen to participate in emissions trading in Switzerland have
the option to rescind their choice at the end of a five year trading period. Given
that they will lose all permits and will have to repay the taxes, it is unlikely that
this option will be exercised. Furthermore, as shown in [5], different policy instru-
ments will induce different technological choices and therefore firms are likely to
become locked into their choice of policy. So our model neglects only a negli-
gible point. Second, the policy in Switzerland does not include a tax exemption
or auctioned permits. Our analysis shows that this is very likely suboptimal, be-
cause some firms will choose emission trading that should be regulated with a tax
according to social welfare considerations. This theoretical result seems to ap-
ply in practice. So far, many firms have opted for permit trading. Given that the
costs of emission volatility is rather small in the context of climate change due to
the long retention period of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, this seems to be
suboptimal.6
Altogether, our analysis shows that it is socially beneficial to let firms choose
their regulation. It has long been accepted in economics that it is more efficient
if firms decide upon their abatement activities under the incentives set by a tax
6See [8] for a detailed argumentation concerning the choice between price- and quantity-based
regulation concepts for stock pollutants.
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or a permit price than if a governmental agency prescribed these activities in the
context of a command-and-control policy. The reason is that firms are usually
better informed about the costs of their abatement activities than a regulator. Our
approach shows that this idea can be taken a step further: It is better if firms decide
how they are regulated than if this decision is made by the government. Again,
the firms simply have the better information and thus the government should only
set the options from which the firms can choose.
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